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ABSTRACT: Examining some recent examples from the Court of Justice of the European 
Union case law, this article intends to unravel the direction to which the European courts 
turn towards in times of crisis. The fiscal restraint and socioeconomic restructuring 
dictated by considerations of public debt reduction affect the daily lives of European 
citizens. However, the crisis and the austerity measures framed by Union law follow the 
new visibility that fundamental rights assumed in the integration process with the entry into 
force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Therefore, in 
accordance to the moto proclaimed by Cunha Rodrigues, the crisis highlights the role of 
jurists and, in particular, the judges while guardians of democracy – understood as the safe 
exercise of fundamental rights. This paper therefore considers the transformative potential 
of the current crisis and its implications on the deepening of citizenship rights in the 
European Union. 
  






In a paper published in 2012, Cunha Rodrigues notes that the crisis challenges jurists and 
appeals to their responsibilities. But the author wonders, puzzled: «Where are the jurists 
then?».
1
 Since the crisis began – explains the former judge of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) –, the screens are occupied by economists, summoned to explain the 
reasons for the crisis that, in many ways, they helped to produce. «And here the question of 
the role of the law returns.»  In conclusion, he adds: «It is up to jurists, based on the notion 
of the European Union as a community of law, to provide answers to the situations which 
demand an idea on the defence and reconstruction of the social model and, therefore, 
institute by institute, to have the capacity to launch a new look at the legal order. To some 
extent, it is about not leaving the politicians alone on the road mulling over feelings of 




Cunha Rodrigues then concludes that the role that lawyers should play in this time of crisis 
– and that politicians should adopt using legal tools – «is to question European policy 
makers on whether, after the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
[CFREU], it is legitimate and possible to return to the time of economic freedoms».
3
 From 
this motto, the challenge of this paper is to try to unravel, in the light of recent ECJ case 
law, the direction to which the European courts are moving towards in times of crisis: «Will 
jurisdictions continue, particularly the ones in the European Union, to accept the mandate 
by the legislature to integrate, with a sense of progress, a poorly intertwined law, for lack of 
consensus or confidence in the praetorian path? Or are they sensitive to the spirit of the 
                                                 
1
 Cf. José Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, Revista de Finanças 
Públicas e Direito Fiscal, 3 (2012), 22 (the translation of the quotes made originally in Portuguese was revised 
and approved by the author, Cunha Rodrigues). Along the same lines, cf. Viriato Soromenho- Marques, “Are 
we on the way to creating a European Behemoth? A Portuguese perspective”, Europe – the final countdown 
or resurrection time? Reclaiming the European project, Henrich Böll Stiftung, 
http://www.boell.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/2013/12/building_an_european_behemoth.pdf, 1, where we 
can read: «The European Union and the eurozone seem to have lost the teleological goals that provide a fair 
democratic ground for public policies: the pursuit of justice, social wellbeing within the limits of a sustainable 
economy, abiding by uncompromising ecological boundaries. Europe has lost the sense of a common purpose, 
the thirst for a better future». 
 
2
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 23. 
 
3
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 24. 
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times, reversing the direction of the case law, namely through emergency clauses or the 
suspension of the principle of social non-regression stated in some latitudes, when 




2. Democracy and courts  
  
As suggested by Paulo Rangel, the XXI century is, and increasingly will be, the century of 
the courts. The XIX century was the century of the legislative, the XX century was the 
century of the executive (government and administration), and the XXI century is likely to, 
markedly, be the century of the courts as guardians of democracy
5
. But a democracy in a 
somewhat different perspective from the one we are used to – that is, not so much from the 
perspective of participation/intervention in decision making, but from the perspective of the 
safe exercise of fundamental rights.
6
 So it is because we live in an era of 
«deterritorialization of power» – as the author explains – i.e., power is not exercised 
territorially in terms of the classical notion of the State (a people, a territory, a sovereignty). 
And the decisions that affect our collective daily lives are not taken in the territory/space in 
which we vote, as the elected representatives of a constituency no longer influence the 




So citizens are increasingly convinced that governments change but policies do not – and 
they do not change because the organizational structure of the state is out of step with the 
needs. States can no longer meet the transnational demands they do not control. And in this 
sense, the gap between the expression of political preferences and the actual capacity of this 
expression to reflect itself in decision-making processes that affect the daily lives of voters 
is increasingly widening. However, in a context where the vote (or the will) of the majority 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 22. 
 
5
 Cf. Paulo Rangel, «Transconstitucionalismo versus interconstitucionalidade. Uma leitura crítica do 
pensamento “transconstitucional” de Marcelo Neves», in Tribunal Constitucional - 35.º Aniversário da 
Constituição de 1976, vol. 1 (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2012), 172. 
 
6
 Cf. Paulo Rangel, O Estado do Estado. Ensaios de política constitucional sobre justiça e democracia 
(Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2009), 11-37. 
 
7
 Cf. Paulo Rangel, «Transconstitucionalismo versus interconstitucionalidade», 158 and 161.  
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of the citizens in a territory no longer has the same impact on decision-making processes as 




It is no coincidence that at the roots of modern democracies are the declarations of the 
rights of man and citizen – alien to ancient democracies. If there is a fundamental element 
for the positive judgment of modern democracy it certainly is the recognition of human 
rights/fundamental rights and the idea of equality that underlies them. However, the current 
democratic paradox (due to the «deterritorialization of power» referred by Paulo Rangel) 
rehabilitates the material dimension of democracy (that is, at heart, the vision of democracy 
as rule of law), linked to the «affirmation of a core of rights and freedoms in force beyond 
the conjectural majorities». This entails the strengthening of the role of the courts in 
ensuring the material substrate of democracy. And the crisis, as we shall see throughout this 
paper, has proved to be an excellent laboratory for this purpose. 
  
The ECJ has proven to be sensitive to the specific circumstances of the economic and 
financial situation in some Member States in the assessment of various issues, either on 
preliminary rulings, or on other forms of Union litigation. However, it did not stop there; 
with regard to the so-called «subjective dimension of the preliminary ruling» – the one 
relevant to the defence of individual rights –, such sensitivity has been revealed. Moreover, 
it is always worth remembering the words of the Court of Justice itself in the famous Van 
Gend & Loos judgment of 1963
9
 according to which «the vigilance of individuals 
concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the 
supervision entrusted (...) to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States» 
through infringement proceedings [Articles 258 and 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU)]. 
 
The ECJ recognizes that the individual play an active role in the legal construction of the 
European Union going beyond the mechanisms of participation (in a representative way) in 
                                                 
8
 Cf. Paulo Rangel, «Transconstitucionalismo versus interconstitucionalidade», 172. 
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decision-making procedures provided for in the Treaties. What Pierre Pescatore soon linked 
to one (more) manifestation of the democratic ideal underlying the integration process has 
been transformed, as Joseph Weiler stresses, to its driving force.
10
 The doctrine has 
considered that individuals interested in promoting the correct application of Union law in 
the Member States and optimizing the effective judicial protection that follows it, have 
contributed to reveal apparently invisible dimensions of European Union law. And the 
economic difficulties that characterize their daily life, their states and their enterprises, give 
citizens one more opportunity to exercise such democratic supervision and guarantee the 
respect for the rights recognized by the legal order of the European Union. 
  
3. Crisis and courts  
  
Nevertheless, the ECJ is in a position to do more. The ECJ has already been confronted 
with preliminary rulings, especially in the field of labour, aiming to find out whether the 
adjustment/austerity reforms demanded by the European Union and implemented by the 
Member States are compatible or not with the protection of the fundamental rights 
recognized by the CFREU. The ECJ has deemed itself incompetent to respond to the 
concerns of the national judges, for alleged lack of a sufficient nexus of the situation in the 
main proceedings with Union law. In other words, these situations did not fall within the 
scope of Union law and, to that extent, would not allow for their assessment under the 




The reluctance of the ECJ, to some extent understandable, can be attributed to the risks that 
its decision would entail: large sums of money are involved and, ultimately, the very future 
of the economic and monetary union.
12
 However, the growing volume of existing 
                                                 
10
 Cf. Joseph Weiler, “The transformation of Europe”, Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), later published in The 
constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” and other essays on European integration 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19-20. 
 
11
 Cf. Order Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, 14 December 2011, Case C-434/11; Order Corpul Naţional al 




 Cf. Catherine Barnard, “Equality, solidarity and the Charter in time of crisis. A case study of dismissal”, in 
Citizenship and solidarity in the European Union. From the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the crisis, the 
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legislation on social protection at European level – as well as the responses developed by 
the European institutions and Member States to overcome the crisis – allow us to question 
the alleged judicial incompetence of the ECJ. Especially as regards the “troika” (European 
Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) interventions in 
Member States such as Portugal.  
 
Moreover, before the grant of financial assistance to Portugal, the adoption of austerity 
measures had been justified by the Portuguese authorities through the decision of the 
Council of the European Union,
13
 adopted on 2 December 2009, which urged the 
Portuguese state to reverse its excessive deficit by 2013 at the latest, in accordance with 
Article 126 (7) TFEU and Article 3 of Regulation 1467/97, of 7 July 1997, on speeding up 




It should be noted that financial assistance to Portugal was granted pursuant to EU law 
[Article 122(2) TFEU and Article 3 of Regulation 407/2010] and is regulated by European 
legal acts (decisions of the Council), including Implementing Decision 2011/344 of 30 May 
2011, and the Implementing Decision 2012/409 of 10 July 2012 amending the first.  All 
these instruments demand that Portugal take measures in the field of labour, especially with 
regard to the reduction of compensation for dismissal, the easing of rules on working times, 
flexibility in overtime payments, etc. (pursuant to Article 3 of the referred Decision 
2011/344), i.e., all matters that are not exactly “alien” to EU law. 
 
However, in a context of correcting excessive deficit (disciplined and monitored by the EU 
institutions), followed by financial assistance (granted and regulated by EU legal acts), it is 
difficult to deny that the concrete austerity solutions implemented economic and financial 
                                                                                                                                                    
state of the art, ed. Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho, Pedro Froufe (Bruxelles/Bern/Berlin/Frankfurt 
am Main/New York/Oxford/Wien: Peter Lang, 2013), 303. 
 
13
 Cf. Relatório do Orçamento de Estado de 2011, Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública 




 Cf. Council Recommendation with a view to ending the excessive government deficit in Portugal, 18 June 




measures under the EU law framework mentioned above – recognized to some extent by 
the ECJ as a «regulatory framework for strengthened economic governance of the Union», 
which «establishes closer coordination and surveillance of the economic and budgetary 
policies conducted by the Member States and is intended to consolidate macroeconomic 




Admittedly, the concrete adjustment measures to adopt are ultimately decided by the 
Member States – and they do have some leeway in reaching agreed goals (moreover, in the 
Portuguese case, it is rather limited, taking into account the detail of the provisions of the 
Decisions granting financial assistance). But such discretion to implement the guidelines on 
budget policy agreed with the EU institutions does not release Member States from the 
obligation to respect the general principles of EU law and the fundamental rights it 
recognizes, pursuant to Article 51(1) CFREU.  
 
In the same way, the European institutions, by defining and monitoring the measures 
introduced by successive State Budgets – and by urging the Portuguese state to fulfil them 
«in full» – cannot evade their responsibilities regarding the compliance with primary EU 
law.
16
 Thus, the doctrine according to which adjustment/austerity reforms demanded by the 
European Union, especially with regard to Member States under intervention, could be 
                                                 
15
 Cf. Judgment Pringle, 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, recital 58. This framework would consist of 
several regulations of the European Parliament and the Council adopted on 16 November 2011, namely, 
Regulation 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation 
1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, 
Regulation 1175/2011 amending Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation 1176/2011 on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, and Directive 2011/85 on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 
 
16
 Pursuant to Article 3(5) of Decision 2011/344, the Council determined that before the end of 2011 and 
according to the specifications of the Memorandum of Understanding, Portugal should adopt a series of 
measures described in detail, namely «implement fully the fiscal consolidation measures foreseen in the 2011 
budget», as well as «fully implement the measures foreseen in the new Budgetary Framework Law». And 
pursuant to Article 3(9) of Decision 2011/344, «within the framework of the assistance to be provided to 
Portugal, together with the IMF and in liaison with the ECB, it shall periodically review the effectiveness and 




scrutinized in light of the general principles and fundamental rights recognized by the 




It is therefore understandable and expected that individuals argue in court that the reforms 
introduced by the austerity measures (especially where labour is concerned) violate the 
fundamental rights protected by EU law. But even if they do not, national courts, aware of 
these developments due to functional imperatives, are required, as European courts, to 
ensure the protection of fundamental rights within the scope of EU law. It is natural and 
desirable that national courts question the ECJ on the compatibility with the requirements 
of CFREU of the “troika” demands and the measures taken by Member States to comply 
with them.  As Cunha Rodrigues wisely explains, «it is not conceivable to interpret Union 
law at different speeds, depending on whether you are in countries (such as Germany, 





It is in this context that the appeal made by Cunha Rodrigues reveals its urgency in the 
sense that «jurists have a duty to confront European policy makers with the real challenge 
they face, to avoid a step backwards for civilization».
19
 As regards the profusion of rights in 
times of crisis, Cunha Rodrigues explains that «In no other period a generation has enjoyed 
as many rights as ours does. Consequently, in recent times, the feeling of disappointment 
and bewilderment by the abysmal distance separating the rights from reality was rarely 
evident.
20
 (...) Were the so called „wasteful‟ Member States of Southern Europe the ones 
who agreed to this profligacy? They were not. It was Europe and its institutions».
21
 And for 
this reason European courts cannot conveniently take refuge in the said «purely internal» 
situations to evade their responsibilities with regard to the protection of fundamental rights 
recognized by the legal order of the Union. 
                                                 
17
 Cf. Barnard, “Equality, solidarity and the Charter in time of crisis. A case study of dismissal". 
 
18
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 22. 
 
19
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 24. 
 
20
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 13. 
 
21
 Cf. Cunha Rodrigues, “Sobre a abundância de direitos em tempo de crise”, 22. 
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4. Crisis and constitutionalism  
  
From a long-term historical perspective, it may be possible to state that, just as the 
Revolution is for public law, the crisis also appears to be for European Union law. If the 
French Revolution is the birthplace of public law as it is understood today, a succession of 
crisis is at the origin of the European integration project and it continues to deepen the legal 
and political construction of the European Union set in motion since the early 1950s. Today 
there is, however, the sense that “this time it is different”. Different, for the better or worse, 
depending on the perspective. But given that the crisis of the war is the one from which the 
European Union has emerged – and the one to which it prevented the united Europe to 
return to –, history taught us that the Union has perhaps surpassed worse challenges than 
the crisis it faces today.  
 
The European construction started as a mere extension of certain military alliances formed 
during World War II. The first embodiment of the integration process was the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1951 which was followed by the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) with the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. Thereupon the 1960s were characterized by the sovereign resistance to the 
construction in motion and by a serious questioning of the fundamental principles of 
European integration. As of July 1965, in opposition to a set of proposals from the 
Commission concerning in particular the financing of the common agricultural policy, 
France ceased to attend meetings of the Council – the episode known as the «empty chair 
crisis». 
 
This crisis was overcome thanks to the Luxembourg Compromise (January 1966), in which 
it was held that whenever very important interests of one or more States are concerned, 
members of the Council shall endeavour to reach solutions which can be adopted by all 
while respecting their mutual interests. The 1970s saw the first enlargements accompanied 
by two major global crises: the dollar and the oil crisis. But integration made significant 
progress in the following decades: in addition to the successive enlargements, the first 
20 
 
institutional reforms took place with the signing of the Single European Act of 1986 and 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 – establishing the European Union –, thus marking perhaps 
the greatest turning point in European integration, which has taken on a political dimension, 
followed by successive patches to the Treaties introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty of 
1997 and Treaty of Nice 2001. 
 
The immediately preceding crisis to the current one was formally dubbed «constitutional 
crisis», since it resulted from the frustration of the first major attempt to consolidate 50 
years of «constitutionalization of the Treaties» through the so-called «Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe» (signed in 2004). The issue stemmed from its non-ratification – 
driven by the “rejections” in the French and Dutch referenda in which it was not possible to 
«neutralize and solve various problems of manipulation and abuse».
22
 So far – as Habermas 
explains – European elections or referenda in all Member States in which anything other 
than national issues or themes were decided have yet to take place.
23
 As the author 
explains, no political party has tried so far to politically shape public opinion through an 
incisive clarification.
24
 Political parties avoid talking about unpopular issues (...) since the 
objective of the parties must be to win elections.
25
 
                                                 
22
 About referenda in general, cf. J. J. Gomes Canotilho, “Pode o referendo aprofundar a democracia?”, in 
“Brancosos” e a interconstitucionalidade. Itinerários dos discursos sobre a historicidade constitucional 
(Coimbra: Almedina, 2006), 305, where the following is stated: «As análises empíricas demonstram também 
que os instrumentos referendários não conseguem neutralizar e resolver muitos problemas de manipulação e 
abuso» («Empirical analysis also demonstrates that the referenda instruments fail to neutralize and solve 
numerous problems of manipulation and abuse»). 
 
23
 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Um ensaio sobre a Constituição da Europa (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2012), 169. 
 
24
 Cf. Habermas, Um ensaio sobre a Constituição da Europa, 161 and 174, where the following is stated: 
«Para alguns partidos políticos, ainda poderia valer a pena arregaçar as mangas, para lutar ofensivamente nas 
ruas pela unificação europeia. A situação não se resolve com a renúncia a grandes projetos» («For some 
political parties, it could still be worth rolling up their sleeves to fight offensively in the streets for European 
unification. The situation is not solved by renouncing to great projects»). 
 
25
 Cf. Habermas, Um ensaio sobre a Constituição da Europa, 169-170, where the following is stated: «O 
facto de os cidadãos estarem enganados quanto à relevância daquilo que acontece em Estrasburgo e Bruxelas, 
lugares que, em termos subjetivos, são afastados, justifica efetivamente uma dívida que os partidos políticos 
têm para com os cidadãos, mas à qual fogem teimosamente. A política, em geral, parece estar a passar 
atualmente por uma situação marcada pela renúncia a uma perspetiva e vontade criadora» («The fact that 
citizens are deceived as to the relevance of what happens in Strasbourg and Brussels, places that are, 
subjectively, removed, effectively warranted a debt that the political parties have towards the citizens, but to 
which they stubbornly flee. The policy, in general, seems to be currently going through a situation marked by 
the resignation of a perspective and creative will».). In the same sense cf. Ulrich Beck, A Europa alemã. De 
21 
 
Nevertheless, the constitutional impasse was settled in 2007 with the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty (in force since December 2009). Any alternative to the Constitutional Treaty could 
not be a simplified (and therefore impoverished) version of a broad consensus: it 
necessarily had to maintain its essential dimensions – and this is what the Lisbon Treaty 
did. Thus, faced with so many and successive crisis, perhaps the biggest misconception 
about the current European crisis is to underestimate its transformative potential and the 
structural implications of a “citizenship of rights” in the integration process. The financial 
assistance to Member States experiencing particular difficulties and the strengthening of 
economic and fiscal coordination between Member States (“economic governance”) are the 
two pillars of the current political and economic architecture of the Union. It is undeniable 
that the actions carried out in this context will have a significant institutional and 
constitutional impact in the integration process (“federalizing process”) that is advancing 
towards a higher level of political integration.  
 
The major question in this context is whether the crisis reveals some crucial dysfunction 
between the expectations of European citizens and the mechanisms of political integration 
available to them – and whether the extended notion of citizenship of rights that the 
European courts helped to forge plays some role in this scenario. To this extent, the current 
crisis definitely questions the relationship between national policy and European policy. 
This is an inevitable path – moreover, the version of the constitutive treaties resulting from 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty already pointed in that direction. In order to do so, 
we need only to look at two provisions: the Articles 6(1) and 4(2) of the TEU. 
 
Under the first, the CFREU now has the «same legal value as the Treaties». The CFREU 
proclaimed in Nice in 2001, gained legally binding force, that is to say, the status of 
primary law enforceable by individuals, which has undeniably marked a new page in the 
European integration process. In turn, Article 4(2) TEU brings together the key elements of 
                                                                                                                                                    
Maquiavel a “Merkievel”: estratégias de poder na crise do euro (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2013), 99, which reads: 
«Seria necessário que neste processo os partidos políticos estabelecidos conseguissem algo como a quadratura 
do círculo: têm de conseguir o salto, em termos organizacionais e programáticos, para a transnacionalidade da 
política europeia, ganhando, simultaneamente, as eleições nacionais» («In this process, it would be necessary 
for the established political parties to be able to do something like squaring the circle: they have to leap, in 




the status of Member State of the European Union: the equality of Member States, respect 
for their national constitutional identities, together with respect for their essential functions. 
Presently, it probably is the provision that better expresses the pluralism that has 
characterized the legal construction of the European Union, which never was to build 
Europe «without the states, much less against the states», as Jean Monnet would say, and 




Note, therefore, that the banking crisis of 2008 and the consequent public debt crisis of 
2010 are contemporary to the new visibility that fundamental rights and the status of 
Member States of the European Union took on the European integration process with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. And both have been put to the test in the management 
of the crisis. To illustrate, here are some examples of ECJ case law – this particular 
institution has always dictated the tone of the integration process, to the point where it is 





5. Crisis and fundamental rights 
 
Regarding the first point, let‟s focus on the protection of fundamental rights of the 
European Union. The fiscal restraint and socioeconomic restructuring dictated by 
considerations of public debt reduction affect the daily life of the EU citizen, whether static 
or dynamic, economically active or not. The flexibility in what concerns the labour market, 
the reform of the pension system, cuts in social spending (health, old age, education, public 
transportation), the increase in social security contributions, higher taxes, especially 
indirect (VAT), are measures particularly likely to affect, directly or indirectly, the exercise 
of fundamental rights concerning labour rights; protection in the event of redundancy, 
sickness or old age, access to services of general economic interest such as health or 
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 Under the principle of loyal cooperation (or European loyalty) the Union and the Member States respect 
and assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties [Article 4(3) TEU]. 
 
27
 Cf. Daniel Sarmiento, Poder judicial e integración europea. La construcción de um modelo jurisdicional 




education – rights with a social dimension enshrined in the CFREU (particularly in its Title 
IV dedicated to «Solidarity», Articles 27 to 38), whose legally binding force is, as 
mentioned, a (another) new page in the European integration process. 
 
The banking crisis of 2008 and the consequent public debt crisis of 2010, “compete” with 
the new visibility that fundamental rights assumed in the European integration process with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. And the anti-crisis measures that have 
been adopted since then must be considered in this context. As Koen Lenaerts teaches, the 
CFREU as a means of primary law is now 1) a standard of interpretation, not only of the 
legal acts of the European Union, but also national measures which fall within the scope of 
application of European Union law, and 2) is likely to serve as a basis for invalidating a 




Indeed, pursuant to Article 51(1) CFREU, it not only binds the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union, but also the Member States themselves «when they are 
implementing Union law», a criterion that must be interpreted to determine the applicability 
of the CFREU when Member States act in the scope of EU law, especially in the fulfilment 
of obligations under Union law. Thus, since the various anti-crisis measures amount, more 
or less directly, to the fulfilment of obligations arising from Union legal acts (regulations, 
directives or decisions), they are likely to be monitored in light of the standard of protection 
of fundamental rights resulting from the Union legal order and whose ultimate guardian is 
the ECJ. 
 
The Thomas Hogan case of 2013
29
 provides an example of the added value in a crisis 
situation of the preliminary ruling as an indirect mechanism of access to Union justice for 
individuals – although the fundamental rights discourse is absent from the reasoning behind 
the decision. The case concerned the protection of employees in cases of insolvency of the 
respective employers, a situation more common than desirable, and in particular the 
                                                 
28
 Cf. Koen Lenaerts, “Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, European 
Constitutional Law Review 8 (2012), 376. 
 
29
 Cf. Judgment Thomas Hogan, 26 April 2013, Case C-398/11. 
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guarantee of pensions. In Ireland, beyond the «statutory pension» (paid by the State to all 
persons who reach retirement age and have paid a certain level of social security 
contributions linked to remuneration during their career), there are supplementary 
occupational pension schemes, fed by contributions from both the employer and employees 
– and which constitute a separate group of assets from the employer's assets. 
 
In this case, ten employees
30
 who worked at Waterford Crystal, an Irish company 
specialized in the manufacturing of crystal, which was declared insolvent in 2009, 
disagreed with the calculation made by the insolvency administrator regarding the 
occupational pensions to which they were entitled. The calculation amounted to less than 
half the amount they would be entitled if they had retired at the normal age.
31
 The workers 
claimed, in court, that Article 8 of Directive 2008/94 on the protection of employees in the 
event of the insolvency of their employer, as interpreted by the ECJ, in particular in the 
Robins judgment of 2007,
32
 had been incorrectly transposed. 
  
Pursuant to Article 8 of Directive 2008/94, Member States shall ensure that the necessary 
measures are taken to protect the interests of employees as well as persons having already 
left the employer‟s undertaking or business at the date of the onset of the employer‟s 
insolvency in respect to rights conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to 
old-age benefits, including survivors‟ benefits, under supplementary occupational or inter-
occupational pension schemes outside the national statutory social security schemes. In the 
mentioned Robins judgment, the ECJ recognized that Member States have considerable 
latitude in determining both the means and the level of protection of rights to old-age 
benefits under supplementary occupational pension schemes in the event of the insolvency 
of the employer; but also considered – and therein lies the heart of the matter – that Article 
8 of the Directive opposed national provisions that may lead to a guarantee of benefits 
                                                 
30
 For eight of them, the date of retirement was planned between 2011 and 2013, and for the remaining two in 
2019 and 2022. 
 
31
 In this case, the calculation was as follows: the old-age benefit is based on the last effective compensation, 




 Cf. Judgment Robins, 25 January 2007, Case C -278/05. 
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under a supplementary occupational pension scheme limited to less than half of the benefits 
to which an employee could otherwise be entitled. 
 
In the Thomas Hogan judgment, the ECJ had no difficulty in considering that Ireland had 
not correctly transposed this provision and that it did not provide the minimum level of 
protection laid down in the Robins judgment. Note that the Irish court expressly asked the 
ECJ, in order to know if the «economic situation (...) constitutes a sufficiently exceptional 
situation to justify a lower level of protection of the plaintiffs‟ interests than might 
otherwise have been required».
33
 There was, therefore, an intention to make use of the 
argument based on the particularly difficult economic and financial situation of Ireland to 
justify a lower level of protection of the interests of workers. But the ECJ rejected the 
argument: «the economic situation of the Member State concerned does not constitute an 
exceptional situation capable of justifying a lower level of protection of the interests of 





The ECJ explained that the minimum level of protection resulting from the Robins 
judgment already considered «the need for balanced economic and social development, by 
taking into consideration, on the one hand, divergent and rather unpredictable 
developments in the economic situations of the Member States and, on the other, the 
necessity of ensuring that employees have a minimum guarantee of protection if their 
employer becomes insolvent owing, for example, to unfavourable developments in 
economic conditions»
35
 – i.e., economic conditions do not develop unfavourably for States 
only, but also for citizens. In the context of the economic and financial crisis affecting the 
Union in general (and some Member States in particular), the ECJ does not seem to lose 
sight of the difficult situations that result from the inability of workers to obtain the 
payment they are due, mainly when it comes to workers close to retirement age; and 
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attention is paid not only to insolvency payments, but also to other types of benefits 
provided under national laws. 
  
Thus, and with regard to this case, the ten Waterford Crystal workers would be entitled to at 
least half of the complementary old-age pensions, and moreover the ECJ stated that, since 
Ireland did not correctly transpose Article 8 of Directive 2008/94 following the Robins 
judgment, this was a sufficiently serious breach of a provision of EU law «in the context of 
any examination which might be carried out in respect of that Member State‟s liability for 
damage caused to individuals».
36
 Answering the last question referred by the national court, 
the ECJ considers that two of the conditions for infringement of EU law by Member 
States
37
 are demonstrated – 1) Article 8 of Directive 2008/94 «is intended to confer rights 
on individuals»
38
 and, having not been properly transposed, 2) it constitutes a «sufficiently 
serious breach of that rule of law» – strengthening, also in this way, the legal position of 
individuals in this case. 
 
Like the Irish court in the Thomas Hogan case – that questioned the ECJ in order to know if 
the «economic situation (...) constitutes a sufficiently exceptional situation to justify a 
lower level of protection of the plaintiffs‟ interests than might otherwise have been 
required» –, a question referred by a German court is currently waiting for a decision39 in 
which it is asked whether EU law, especially in matters of social protection (Regulation 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems) and EU citizenship (Articles 18 
and 20 of the TFEU and Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States), 
precludes a Member State, «in order to prevent an unreasonable recourse to non-
contributory social security benefits (...) which guarantee a level of subsistence, from 
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excluding in full or in part European Union citizens in need from accessing those benefits 
which are provided to their own nationals who are in the same situation». 
 
Unfortunately, the details of the factual, legal, and economic/financial situation eventually 
underlying the problem in question are not available at the moment – one which does not 
seem, at first glance, to deserve a positive response, taking into account the settled case law 
of the ECJ on the matter.
40
 But in any case, such questions are indicative of the attention 
given by national courts while facing and questioning some of the budget restraining 
measures in light of EU law, seeking to optimize the judicial protection of rights for 
individuals under European law. As Cunha Rodrigues explains, it stems from the economic 
analysis of law that every fundamental right represents a cost, generally enforceable against 
public authority, and, under certain conditions, to individuals.
41
 There is nothing new about 
it – fundamental rights necessarily involve financial costs. Therefore, to use the allegedly 
inevitable argument of «there is no money, rights must be limited, adapted, restructured» 
cannot prevent us from scrutinizing its consequences in the sphere of law.  
  
6. Crisis and loyalty  
  
European courts are not only aware of the unfavourable economic conditions of EU citizens 
in the context of crisis. The ECJ has also proved sensitive to the unfavourable economic 
conditions evolution of Member States particularly affected by the crisis, as demonstrated 
by the Greece v. Commission order of the General Court seized on interim measures 




The process that gave rise to the order dealt with a decision of 7 December 2011 in which 
the Commission, on the one hand, qualified as state aid incompatible with the internal 
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market a total amount of EUR 425 million paid in 2009 by the Greek authorities to the 
Greek agricultural sector, designed to repair damages that occurred after adverse weather 
conditions (experienced in the 2008 and 2009 campaigns – drought, high temperatures, 
excessive rainfall and diseases), and, on the other hand, ordered the authorities to recover 




After having brought an action for the annulment of this Decision before the General Court, 
the Hellenic Republic submitted an application for the suspension of the operation of the 
Decision. In essence, the question raised was of whether, given the «quite particular and 
exceptional difficulties linked to the austerity measures which have been a feature of the 
reality of the Greek economy for several years»,
44
 the obligation to recover the sums 
granted from the beneficiaries must be described as «excessive», insofar as it imposed the 
recovery of aid until 7 December 2011, although the plight of the Greek agricultural sector 
had degraded further since its allocation. 
 
The President of the General Court found that the answers to these legal issues were not 
immediately obvious and called for a detailed examination in the main proceedings, for 
they seemed, at first sight, to be sufficiently serious to establish a prima facie case 
(meaning that the main proceedings did not appear, at this stage, manifestly unfounded). As 
regards the urgency of the application, the President of the General Court recalls that 
Member States may «seek the grant of interim measures by asserting that the contested 




It is unfortunate that no reference was made to the «essential functions» of the States within 
the meaning of Article 4(2) TEU, which may be understood as regarding the ECJ's relative 
shyness to lay hold of this still new and sensitive provision. However, the reasoning put 
forward in the case by the Hellenic Republic, and to which the Union interim measures 
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judge was sensitive to, denotes how the performance of «State tasks» or «essential 
functions» of the States in times of crisis are duly taken into account. 
  
In the case, the Hellenic Republic claimed that a forced immediate  recovery of the disputed 
sums by the officials of the tax administration from several hundreds of thousands of 
farmers would entail «administrative difficulties liable to cause it serious and irreparable 
harm»: the Hellenic Republic intended to concentrate its resources on the establishment of 
«effective tax authorities that are capable, in particular, of identifying and pursuing the „big 
tax avoiders‟ and combating tax fraud; the volume of which, in terms of loss of revenue, 




However, requiring the aforementioned  massive intervention of the agents of the Greek tax 
authorities, this forced mass recovery would have prevented this administration to devote 
itself «to one of their priorities, namely combating tax avoidance and collecting sums 
eluding tax that are nearly 50 times greater than the contested payments».
47
 Furthermore, 
and in relation to the public order argument, the social climate in Greece was marked by «a 
deterioration of confidence in the public authorities, generalised discontent and a feeling of 
injustice», in particular the violent demonstrations against the austerity measures adopted 




In such circumstances, the President of the General Court concluded that «the risk, invoked 
by the Hellenic Republic, that immediate recovery of the payments at issue in the 
agricultural sector may trigger demonstrations liable to degenerate into violence appears 
neither purely hypothetical nor theoretical or uncertain».
49
 Thus the President of the 
General Court acknowledged that in «the exceptional circumstances which currently obtain 
in relation to the economic and social situation in Greece», it was legitimate to accord 
priority to the interests invoked by that Member State, consisting of, «first, preserving 
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social peace and preventing social unrest and, second, being able to concentrate the 
capacities of its tax authorities on the tasks which it regards as paramount for the 
country»,
50
 while suspending the execution only exposed the interests of the Union to the 
risk of postponing the national measures for recovery to a later date, without evidence that, 
by itself, this postponement would harm the chances of success of these measures. In so 
doing, the implementation of the contested decision, in so far as it forced the Hellenic 
Republic to recover sums paid from the beneficiaries, was suspended until the outcome of 
the main proceedings.  
 
The same attention to economic circumstances is paid within the framework of 
infringement proceedings. For example, in 2012, the ECJ took into account Ireland's 
economic situation to scale back the amount of the penalty indicated by the Commission in 
a second action for infringement. In the Commission v. Ireland judgment of 2008,
51
 the ECJ 
declared that Ireland had failed to correctly transpose the Directive 85/337 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. Since 
Ireland had not adopted the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, the 
Commission brought an action against Ireland for not complying with the judgment of the 
ECJ, specifying, pursuant to Article 260 TFEU, the amount of the penalty which it 
considered appropriate in the circumstances.  
 
Within this second action for infringement, Ireland argued in its defence that the reduction 
in the amount requested by the Commission was not likely to put the goal of deterrence of 
the penalty in question, to the extent that, in times of crisis, a reduced amount has a 
deterrent effect on the state equivalent to a higher amount in «normal» economic 
conditions.
52
 The ECJ was sensitive to the argument. In the Commission v. Ireland 
judgment of 2012, taking into account the available economic data, the ECJ concluded that 
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Ireland's capacity to pay had been subject to a certain regression in an economic context of 




7. Crisis and European citizenship  
  
In a 2012 study coordinated by Miguel Poiares Maduro, the author argues that the root 
causes of the crisis are democratic problems. In other words, the origin of the crisis can be 
found in democratic failures: 1) whether they are Member States' failures (which impose 
externalities on others in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union and are not able 
to control a set of mobile interests that escape their sphere of activity), 2) or failures of 
governance of the Union (which has not been able to infuse its institutional system with a 
true democratic potential nor the capacity of effective governance that the crisis requires). 
 
Maduro argues that the failures in resolving the crisis are attributable to the diffuse nature 
of European political authority and its excessive reliance on national policies. Furthermore, 
Member States are unable to internalize the consequences of the interdependence generated 
by the euro, the integrated markets, as well as the European and global movement of 
capital. Consequently, the Union cannot govern effectively and its policies are prisoners of 
national policies. Just pay attention, we would add, to the genetic defect of the Economic 
and Monetary Union: the Member States sovereign power over the issuance of currency 
and its value (i.e., monetary and exchange sovereignty) is removed without sharing 
sovereignty in taxation and budget matters – which continue to be controlled by the 
Member States, without moving towards a genuine economic union.
54
 For these reasons, 
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Therefore, if Maduro is correct – that is, if democratic failures are the root of the crisis –, 
could the crisis have been avoided (or at least minimized) if the problems of governance in 
the European Union were resolved (i.e., problems of coordination and convergence 
between the political entities involved)? Probably so. The legal and political solution to the 
problems faced by the Union depends on the deepening of the federal component of the 
European system. Only that deepening can prevent the financial problem of a Member State 
from becoming a problem of credibility of the Union as a whole. Only that deepening may 
allow the Union to play economic and social functions that act as a support network for the 




And such deepening of the federal system components (as a solution to the crisis and 
answer to the democratic problems of the Member States and the Union) is necessarily 
accompanied by the deepening of citizenship rights that European courts helped to forge. In 
this scenario it is indispensable to discuss the extent to which the dynamics of fundamental 
rights affect the integration process itself – or scrutinize the potential of the citizenship of 
rights in times of crisis. And do it while wielding political and constitutional tools that 
already exist (or may emerge) during a crisis context. 
 
The debate on European citizenship arose in the 1970s in order to grant a set of civil, 
political and social rights to the nationals of a Member State who were exercising economic 
freedoms in another Member State so as to put them on an equal footing with the nationals 
of the host Member State, and in this way promote the trend towards equality of legal 
positions among nationals of Member States in the then Community. In this sense, 
European citizenship has always been related to the need for equality among nationals of 
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different Member States – that would enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided 
for in the Treaties.
57
 And this idea of shared rights and duties (which are provided for by 
EU law and do not depend on the Member State)
58
 is able to foster a sense of belonging to 
the Union among individuals. 
 
Since the idea of national citizenship is traditionally anchored to the preservation of the 
nation-state (or to the definition of “us” and the “other”), the recognition of the European 
citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty, raised the question of 1) what kind of political 
community could be created beyond the nation-state, 2) what relationship would it have 
with national political communities, 3) who could enjoy such a status and which rights 
would they have – all issues that are at the heart of European integration as a political 
project and are still subject of ongoing debate.
59
 Nevertheless, since it does not serve the 
preservation of the nation-state and it is based on a plurality of nationalities, European 
citizenship could not have – and does not have – the exact same nature of national 




European citizenship, unlike national citizenship, does not presuppose the community of 
which the citizen is a member – it creates this community (of rights). In other words, 
European citizenship is built and developed through the exercise of rights – and for this the 
case law of the ECJ contributed greatly, evolving from the provocation of national courts 
via preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU). For no other reason the debate on European 
citizenship developed in parallel (and eventually was confused with) to that of the 
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protection of fundamental rights within the Union: if Union citizens are holders of rights 
provided for in the Treaties (pursuant to Article 20(2) TFEU), they are also (and especially) 
holders of fundamental rights recognized by the European legal order. In this context it is 
arguable that the essence/substance of European citizenship resides precisely in the 
protection of fundamental rights. 
 
As explained by Cunha Rodrigues, soon the case law of the ECJ «showed the potential of 
the new institute». Since the Grzelczyk judgment of 2001,
61
 European citizenship has come 
to be referred to by the ECJ as «aiming to become the fundamental status of nationals of 
Member States». Therefore, as explained by the former judge of the ECJ, through «the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination but also by the recognition that 
citizenship entails a hard core of rights that cannot be postponed and even tends to expand 
(hence, citizenship aims to become a fundamental status), the case law of the Union found 




Cunha Rodrigues continues: «It created, as it were, an interaction between citizenship and 
fundamental rights which most sensitive and well observed effect by the doctrine is the 
application of Union law to situations that have, hitherto, tended to be regarded as purely 
internal. The number of decisions in which, under the status of European citizen, rights 
were recognized is significant, in matters as diverse as the right to move and reside, 
protection of family life, the right to a name, or access to education».
63
 For this reason, we 
would add, the idea that European citizenship (Article 20 TFEU) may allow  individuals to 
access the standard of fundamental rights protection of the Union, and therefore, the highest 
level of protection it pursues
64
 (when another link/connection to Union law does not 
become obvious), is so important in the current times of integration.
65
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Following the well-known Zambrano judgment of 2011,
66
 some doctrine has argued the 
importance of defining the substance of European citizenship by reference to the substance 
of the rights conferred by the Treaties.
67
 Armin von Bogdandy even suggests the «reverse 
of the Solange doctrine»,
68
 now applied to Member States from the legal order of the 
Union. In this sense, the disregard of fundamental rights protected by the Union, by a 
Member State, even on a so-called «purely internal» issue, could be a violation of the 
substance of European citizenship – and would allow the individual to invoke the status as 
a European citizen (and the rights that it entails) before national courts, without having to 
search for fictitious or hypothetical connections with EU law to benefit from the European 




It would be a kind of «European rescue mechanism for fundamental rights», as it was 
named by Viviane Reding in her opening speech on the XXV FIDE Congress (Federation 
of European International Law, Tallinn/Estonia, 31 May 2012), specifically referring to 
such doctrinal current.
70
 For no other reason did the European Commission recently launch 
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a public consultation on the justice sector in the Union by which it intends to know, with 
regard to fundamental rights, if citizens understand that the rights enshrined in the CFREU 




   
8. Final remarks  
  
The European Union is a story of crises turned into opportunities for a deepening of the 
integration process. What we see today is just another page in that story. It seems more 
painful because we are the ones who live through it, we do not recall it through the 
accounts of others. This leads us to remember, with Ulrich Beck, the definition of crisis by 
Antonio Gramsci: «the crisis, says Gramsci, is the moment when the old world order dies 
and when it is necessary to fight for a new world, against resistance and contradictions. Yet, 
it is precisely this transition phase that is marked by many misconceptions and disorders. It 
is precisely this that we are currently watching: a caesura, an interregnum, the simultaneity 
of collapse and emergency – with results to be determined».72 
  
Crisis management while experiencing the crisis is difficult – bewilderment, fear, 
frustration, and restlessness, «all this is typical of these confusing situations» – mainly 
because «people's expectations are no longer compatible with the institutional arrangements 
that should satisfy them», as Ulrich Beck explains. But the «discrepancy between 
expectations and reality is always a motor for social mobilization»,
73
 concludes the author. 
  
To this extent, the reporting of past crisis illustrates that, although there are no miraculous 
solutions, the crisis fosters consensus and commitments in which the machinery of the 
Union has always been based – and the path always leads to «more Europe» or «a better 
Europe». And the context of crisis provides another opportunity for the ECJ, in dialogue 
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with national courts – in turn driven by citizens zealous of their rights – to demonstrate the 
active and decisive role that European courts have always played in building a Union of 
law. Because European integration is made possible by legal rules – and the judicial 
decisions which apply them. 
 
